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INTRODUCTION: RESEARCH DESIGN AND KEY CONCEPTS!
!
Since the 1980s the major part of development aid has been distributed with some kind of conditions. 
Donors require aid-receiving states to comply with conditions or to impose certain reforms in order to receive 
development aid (Stokke, 1995: 1). Often donors provide financial aid dependent on the aid-receiving state’s 
performance on certain indicators; for example ensuring respect for human rights, implementing elements of 
the good governance agenda or ensuring market liberalization. Giving aid dependent on certain conditions is 
a widespread practice as reflected in behavior of donor governments, Non-Governmental Organizations and 
Intergovernmental Organizations. Different kinds of conditionality establish specific sets of conditions and 
establish diverse relationships between donor and receiving government. One type of conditionality is of 
particular interest to political science: political conditionality. Political conditionality entails the distribution of 
financial aid to developing countries dependent on certain conditions regarding the political characteristics of 
the aid-receiving country. The goal of political conditionality is to promote democracy, human rights and 
accountability in the aid-receiving countries (Stokke, 1995: 1). By requiring the aid-receiving government to 
comply with certain conditions, donors can ensure that the given aid will be effective, as it allows them to 
influence the aid-receiving government and its policies (Riddell, 2007: 235; Stokke, 1995: 12). When aid-
receiving states fail to respect the conditions, donors can decide to partially or completely suspend and even 
withhold development aid. This allows donors to spur development in the aid-receiving state according to the 
donor’s outlook on development.!
! However, it is not clear how effective this political conditionality is. There is an ongoing debate in 
both the academic sphere as the political sphere on whether the reforms political conditionality proposes are 
appropriate and effective.!!
RESEARCH QUESTION AND RESEARCH GOAL!
This research aims to contribute to this debate by taking an empirical stance on political conditionality. It will 
do so by studying two cases. The first case is the case of Kenya, where in 1992 multiparty elections were 
issued after donor sanctions. The second case is the more recent case of Uganda, where aid was withheld in 
reaction to the issuing of anti-homosexuality laws. By studying these cases this research aims to answer the 
following research question: what have been the effects of political conditionality in development aid to 
Kenya and Uganda? In order to answer this question, the research will address the following questions: do 
aid-receiving countries react to donor sanctions by implementing the required reforms? What are the effects 
of such reforms implemented in order to comply with donor conditions? Are these reforms effective in 
reaching donor goals and what factors influence this effectiveness? Can political conditionality be considered 
effective in the two cases?!
! This study offers insight in the types and workings of political conditionality, which is important as it 
offers insight in the effectiveness of widespread donor behavior in the practice of development aid.!!
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: KEY CONCEPTS!
The research is centered on a number of main concepts which need a short introduction. The first concept is 
development aid. Development aid is given by a donor (or multiple donors) to a recipient in order to 
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contribute to the economic and social development of a state and its society. Development aid comes in 
many forms and can have various goals. For example, the aid can consist of a money grant, a loan (financial 
aid), material gifts or the supplying of expertise (by sending experts to the receiving country). A different type 
of aid is the foreign aid for emergency relief. This is a short-term influx of aid in order to solve an emergency 
situation, for example to solve the consequences of a natural disaster. This research focuses on 
development aid given on a long-term basis. There are different actors involved in the practice of 
development aid. Donors can be different parties, ranging from individuals to NGOs or governments. The 
receiving party can differ as well, ranging from a certain group of individuals to a municipality, an NGO or a 
government. The development aid considered in this research is narrowed to aid given from government to 
government, which is called Official Development Assistance (Riddell, 2007: 18-19).!
! The research is concerned with the effectiveness of this aid. Effectiveness can be understood to be 
the contribution of the aid - subject to political conditionality - to the economic and social development of a 
state and its society. Aid is considered as effective if a society benefits from the aid and if the aid positively 
contributes for example to the development of a state, reducing of poverty or decreasing inequality in its 
society. This research tries to interpret effectiveness more narrowly, assessing the effectiveness of the 
conditions political conditionality imposes according to the goals it aims to pursue.!
! The last concept in need of an introduction is the concept of conditionality. Conditionality is briefly 
mentioned here, as it will be addressed more extensively in the first chapter. One can speak of aid 
conditionality when donors impose conditions on the distribution of development aid. The aid-receiving 
government is supposed to respect these conditions or to commit to reform in order to respect these 
conditions. If the receiving government does not respect the conditions, the aid can be withheld or 
suspended (Riddell, 2007: 235-236). Multiple types of conditionality exist, of which the most important are 
policy conditionality, process conditionality and pro-poor conditionality. Policy conditionality is considered the 
traditional conditionality: imposing requirements on aid-receiving government’s policies (Riddell, 2007: 
235-236). Process conditionality is considered to act like a partnership between donor and receiving 
governments or even between donor and receiving society (Hefeker & Michaelowa, 2005 : 164). Pro-poor 
conditionality consists of conditions specifically required in order to stimulate the process of poverty relief in 
the developing countries, an approach often argued for (see for example Lewis, 1993).!!
RESEARCH METHOD!
This research will consist of a comparative case study. Through an in-depth qualitative examination of two 
cases the research tries to explore the relationship between political conditionality and its consequences, 
thereby exploring its effectiveness. The two cases are selected as they show a situation in which donors 
withheld or threatened to withhold aid. This offers the opportunity to study the impact and consequences of 
these donor actions, and the impact and consequences of reforms imposed by the aid-receiving countries in 
order to regain aid. Following Yin’s classification of cases (Yin, 2009 in Bryman 2012: 70), both cases can be 
considered typical cases as there is no reason to assume that the two cases differ substantially from other 
situations where donors withhold or threaten to withhold aid. Of course the context of these cases differs 
substantially from other situations, but the reasons for donors to withhold the aid - the aid-receiving state not 
acting in accordance with donor conditions or donor goals - are assumed to be similar to other cases. This is 
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suitable for this research, as it allows to carefully explore the effectiveness of political conditionality beyond 
these two cases. By conducting an in-depth examination and comparison of the cases the research attempts 
to isolate the factors explaining the effectiveness of political conditionality. By comparing these factors and 
the success or failure of political conditionally in both cases, the research explores what explains this 
effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of political conditionality.!
! This design has a number of strong aspects. Looking at two cases offers the possibility to examine 
the workings of political conditionality in more than one context, thereby making conclusions on the 
effectiveness of political conditionality stronger (Bryman, 2012: 74). Limiting the research to just two cases, 
however, also offers the possibility for in-depth examination, making it possible to explore all the different 
factors at play. The fact that the cases differ in time-setting offers the possibility to consider the short-term 
effectiveness (Uganda) and the long-term effectiveness (Kenya) of political conditionality.!
! However, the design also shows a number of weaknesses. It might be impossible to attribute the 
reforms in the cases exclusively to political conditionality and donor pressure. There are a range of other 
factors at play which influence the effectiveness and implementation of donor conditions as well. External 
factors (for example a neighboring country threatening war), internal factors (such as a heavily divided 
society) and contextual factors (for example the situation of global politics) may also influence the decisions 
an aid-receiving government will make. 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POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY: AN INTRODUCTION!
!
AID CONDITIONALITY: AN OVERVIEW!
This first chapter will offer an overview, definition and conceptualization of political conditionality. Over the 
last thirty-five years the practice of providing development aid dependent on certain conditions emerged and 
developed. The character of conditions as well as the intensity of the conditions varied widely. Conditionality 
in development aid originated in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans during the 1980s. 
Both these donors attached policy conditions to their structural adjustment loans (Riddell, 2007: 236). In 
order to qualify for these loans aid-receiving states were required to commit to certain policies or reform of 
policies. The number of conditions expanded quickly, as did the number of donors, with states and different 
institutions following the IFI’s practice (Riddell, 2007: 236). The conditions mainly considered economic 
policies in the aid-receiving states. These conditions, aimed at promoting market liberalization, form the first 
generation conditionality (Stokke, 1995: 1). In 1989 the World Bank concluded that in order to maximize the 
effect of the conditions and the effects of the development aid the economic conditions should be 
accompanied by political and administrative conditions, leading to the World Bank attaching political and 
administrative conditions to its loans (World Bank, 1989: 183-192). These conditions, aimed at promoting 
government accountability and democratization, form the second generation conditionality (Stokke, 1995: 1). 
Following the World Bank many other donors started to attach political conditions to development aid. This 
soon became a widespread practice, as illustrated by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee 
stating that “there is a vital connection between open, democratic and accountable political systems […] and 
the effective and equitable operation of economic systems” (DAC, 1989 in Stokke, 1995: 23). A further 
example is Japan announcing in 1991 that the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights was to 
be considered when deciding whether to provide development aid to a country (Nelson & Eglinton, 1992: 
17). Both the first generation conditionality as the second generation involve conditions regarding policies of 
the aid-receiving country. Policy conditionality is marked by donors imposing requirements on the aid-
receiving government’s policies (Riddell, 2007: 235-236). This practice - mainly the second generation 
conditionality - is nowadays still widespread in development aid.!
! In reaction to the performance of policy conditionality a new type of conditionality emerged. Process 
conditionality will be addressed briefly as it is not the focus of this research. Process conditionality 
establishes a different kind of relationship between donor and recipient. In contrast to policy conditionality, 
process conditionality allows room for input from the aid-receiving party. In a joint process donor and 
recipient reach common goals and conditions for the aid. Process conditionality is a widespread practice as 
well, illustrated by the approach to development aid the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSP) propose. Countries receiving loans from the World Bank are encouraged to produce a strategy for 
development, based on shared goals and societal participation, in order to receive the loan (World Bank, 
2011).!
! Aid conditionality not only differs regarding its character or the character of the conditions it sets. A 
number of other differences should be considered as well. The different kinds of conditionality establish 
differing relationships between the donor and recipient of development aid. State practice shows that when a 
receiving government does not respect the policy conditions required by donors, the aid can be withheld or 
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suspended (Riddell, 2007: 235-236). The donor’s reaction to withhold or suspend aid marks a negative 
linkage, associated with the carrot-and-stick-approach (Van Cranenburgh, 1995: 45). An example of such a 
negative linkage is the withholding of aid to Rwanda by the Belgian government and the United States in 
1990. In reaction to human rights violations - a component of second generation conditionality - the Belgian 
government (unilaterally) froze agreed upon financial aid to Rwanda (Stokke, 1995: 50-51). The US also 
condemned the violations and suspended all aid except for humanitarian purposes (Human Rights Watch, 
1993: 25). Conditionality can be expressed ex ante, when receiving governments are sanctioned for failing to 
comply to the agreed upon conditions while aid is being given, or ex post, when conditions must be fulfilled 
before aid will be given (Babb & Carruthers, 2008: 15) . In contrast to the negative linkage in conditionality 1
stands a positive linkage. A positive linkage focuses on a constructive dialogue between the donor and 
recipient in order to create conditions favorable to development (Van Cranenburgh, 1995: 47-48). This 
approach can be associated with process conditionality.!
! This research will consider political conditionality. It is thus concerned with examining the practice of 
disbursing development aid dependent on political conditions. It is furthermore important to note that the 
research concerns political conditionality with a negative linkage.!!
THE DEBATE ON POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY!
Since the beginning of the practice of aid conditionality there has been an ongoing debate on the 
effectiveness of political conditionality. This debate has been taking place both in the academic sphere as in 
the political sphere.!
! In the academic sphere, the debate can be illustrated by considering the debate between Jan Pronk 
and Ajit Singh in the journal Development and Change. Pronk seems to make a case for political 
conditionality by introducing the concept of aid as a catalyst. He highlights that aid is often given with political 
objectives (among other objectives) such as supporting peace or promoting democracy (Pronk, 2001: 613). 
Pronk states that development aid works when both donors as recipients ensure good quality in the 
providing and using of aid (Pronk, 2001: 620). Good governance is essential in achieving this good quality 
and should be ensured by donor and aid-receiving governments (Pronk, 2001: 620). Making future aid 
conditional on ensuring good policies in the developing country is a way to ensure this good quality and 
therefore the success of aid (Pronk, 2001: 621). Political conditionality can thus be a way for the donor to 
ensure the effectiveness of the given aid (Riddell, 2007: 235). Aid becomes a catalyst for development as 
conditionality is a way to help the aid-receiving government meet conditions for good policy-making (Pronk, 
2001: 626). Aid as a catalyst is an important concept, as this way “aid can help establish the conditions 
under which development might sustain itself” (Pronk, 2001: 627). !
! Singh criticizes Pronk’s concept. His main criticism concerns the lack of policy ownership. He states 
that in order to use development aid as a catalyst for development, recipient countries need to agree with 
donors’ ideas and conditions (Singh, 2002: 296). Policy ownership - autonomy in deciding which policies to 
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pursue - has been one of the critical factors in the excellent performance of developing countries in the 
decades 1950-1980 (Singh, 2002: 300). This seems to lead to the conclusion that in order for states to 
develop, they need a level of policy ownership. Political conditionality deprives states of this policy ownership 
(Singh, 2002: 300). Pronk downplays Singh’s criticism by pointing out that it is unclear to what extent 
developing countries really enjoyed policy autonomy in the period highlighted by Singh (Pronk, 2003: 
385-386).!
! Other academics point out further problems associated with political conditionality. Geske Dijkstra 
emphasizes that the effectiveness of political conditionality is harmed by donors not consistently imposing 
and upholding sanctions when aid-receiving countries failed to comply with the set conditions (Geske 
Dijkstra, 2002: 327-329). This way, aid-receiving countries do not feel the urge to comply with the conditions. 
She concludes, however, that when conditions are specific, compliance levels tend to be high (Geske 
Dijkstra, 2002: 331). Uvin further illustrates donor inconsistencies by pointing out that donor countries will 
often let other interests prevail over the goals of political conditionality (Uvin, 1993: 69). Babb and Carruthers 
furthermore highlight problems of legitimacy. As the conditions are set by Western donors - thus grounded in 
Western ideas - they can be seen as imposing Western ideals on the aid-receiving countries (Babb & 
Carruthers, 2008: 21). This seems to complement Singh’s argument. There are often cultural and 
geographical differences between donor and recipient, raising the question if Western donors are even able 
to give a sound advice to the recipient country (Stokke, 1995: 36-37). These differences can lead to a feeling 
of unjust interference in the internal politics of the aid-receiving state. This feeling may lead to non-
compliance with the set conditions (Stokke, 1995: 37), or even a unilateral termination of the aid relationship 
by the recipient state as occurred in the case of Indonesia and the Netherlands in 1992 (Van Cranenburgh, 
1995: 47). Babb and Carruthers furthermore boldly state that there is “considerable evidence that 
[conditionality] is ineffective” (Babb & Carruthers, 2008: 21-22). Riddell and Uvin add to this the warning that 
policy conditionality can have an adverse effect on the poorest of a nation (Riddell, 2007: 243; Uvin, 1993: 
71). Easterly confirms this warning and goes even as far as arguing for an end to all kinds of conditionality in 
order to make development aid work (Easterly, 2006: 368).!!
In the political sphere different stances are taken as well. State practice shows different viewpoints on 
political conditionality. Consider the USA, where “the US Government is required by law to cut off aid to 
regimes coming to power by overthrowing a democratically elected government” (Lancaster, 1993: 12; 
Foreign Assistance Act, 1961: Section 620M). The issuing of such a law shows a clear commitment to 
political conditionality. Contrast this with the UK government’s position on conditionality, stating in a policy 
paper that the performance of conditionality “has been mixed and […] in summary the UK government will 
[…] promote a more equal approach in which donors do not impose conditions but agree benchmarks with 
partners” (DFID, 2005: 18). Adding to this that the World Bank - considered one of the founding fathers of 
policy conditionality (Riddell, 2007: 235) - regularly conducts reviews of the effectiveness of its own imposed 
conditionality and finds negative results on it (e.g. World Bank: 2005, 2007), it is evident that the discussion 
on political conditionality is not temporary nor lightweight.!!!
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CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY!
The above debate offers some insight on how to define political conditionality. Political conditionality is 
understood as the providing of development aid dependent on political conditions. These conditions impose 
requirements on the policies and politics of the aid-receiving states and/or requirements to reform these. If a 
state does not comply with the conditions set by the donor, the donor can decide to withhold or suspend the 
aid. Different objectives are associated with political conditionality. Three main objectives seem to be evident: 
a move towards democracy, the promotion of basic human rights and a call for good governance (Stokke, 
1995: 1; Pronk, 2001: 612). The various conditions donors set in order to reach these objectives can be 
found in theory as well as in donor statements and practice. It is important to note that this section offers 
some examples of conditions in order to introduce and explore political conditionality. The list of conditions 
mentioned here is not exhaustive.!
! The commitment to promote democracy is illustrated by the above mentioned US legislation. The 
case of Kenya will further offer examples of donor conditions and actions aimed to promote democracy. !
! The objective of human rights promotion involves the human rights as codified in the 1948 United 
Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the different convenants following the Declaration (e.g. 
ICCPR, ICESC). This body of rights concerns basic economic, social, cultural and political rights as well as 
more specific rights on different topics (e.g. torture, enforced disappearances). Donor conditions in order to 
promote respect for these rights can be found in Dutch development policy. In a 2013 policy paper the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs commits to the promotion of human rights. It does so for example by helping 
governments and local societies to find and to try offenders of sexual violence in (post-)conflict situations 
(Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken [Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 2013: 27).!
! In order to study the conditions which aim to promote good governance it is necessary to offer a 
definition of good governance first. Good governance refers (inter alia) to high quality of government, 
legitimacy and authority of state institutions, a fair division and distribution of power, enhanced accountability 
of government to its society and sound budget management in the public sector (Grindle, 2004: 545 note 2; 
Riddell, 2007: 374). The belief in the necessity of good governance is widespread. Consider for example the 
recommendation of the Commission for Africa, stating that “The first priorities must be achieving good 
governance, …” (Commission for Africa, 2005: 85). Examples of conditions regarding good governance can 
be found in German policies of development aid. In a policy paper on budget support to developing countries 
the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development marks good governance in the aid-
receiving country as a requirement for the granting of budget support (BMZ [German Federal Ministry For 
Economic Cooperation and Development], 2008: 15-16). The 2009 German coalition agreement specifies 
this as states showing “transparent budget management, [and] fighting corruption and 
mismanagement” (CDU, CSU & FDP, 2009: 154).!!
EFFECTIVENESS OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY!
The effectiveness of political conditionality can be assessed according to the objectives of political 
conditionality. The more these objectives are reached, the more effective the conditionality is. A number of 
factors are assumed to influence the effectiveness of political conditionality in general. A first factor is the 
relationship between the donor and recipient of the aid. If there is a long-term aid relationship between those 
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two, it is more likely that the political conditions are followed up by the recipient state (Riddell, 2007: 245). 
The second factor concerns whether the recipient state deems the aid (to which the conditions are attached) 
important (Stokke, 1995: 44). If the recipient state is dependent on the aid, it is more likely to comply with 
donor conditions (Stokke, 1995: 44). The third factor regards whether there is a coordinated donor action 
(Stokke, 1995: 45). If such a coordination is missing, the receiving state can easily ignore the requirements 
and focus on other donors. However, if multiple donors threaten to cut the aid if conditions are not respected, 
the aid-receiving country will be compelled to respect the conditions (Stokke, 1995: 45). Both factors 
influence the decision of the aid receiving country to comply with the conditions and in that way enhance the 
effectiveness of political conditionality. 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EFFECTIVENESS OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY: DEMOCRACY IN KENYA!
!
The case of Kenya offers an opportunity to explore the effectiveness of political conditionality in development 
aid. The effectiveness of the political conditions donors attached to aid to Kenya will be examined by 
assessing the quality of the 1992 elections, the quality of the subsequent elections (up to 2013), and by 
assessing incidents regarding human rights. By examining these events the effectiveness of political 
conditionality will be assessed in terms of reaching its goal - building democracy in Kenya.!!
INTRODUCTION TO KENYA: THE ROAD TO MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS!
Since its independence Kenya received an increasing volume of foreign aid from various donor countries . It 2
showed a sound trend in economic and social development which was rewarded with popularity among 
donors (Waller, 1995: 117; Grosh and Orvis, 1996: 55). This situation changed when President Daniel Arap 
Moi succeeded former President Kenyatta in 1978. Moi strengthened the one-party regime of the Kenya 
African National Union (KANU) and ruled the country in a more and more authoritarian way. Moi’s regime 
was marked by corruption, nepotism and a bad human rights record. An illustration of the violation of human 
rights is the queuing system in elections, whereby voters were required to queue behind a portrait of their 
favored candidate (Human Rights Watch, 1992). This made voters vulnerable to intimidation and violence 
based on their political preferences. At the end of the 1980s the Kenyan people’s dissatisfaction with the 
government led to civil unrest. Anti-government demonstrations calling for democracy were harshly turned 
down by the government. This led to reactions from Norway, stating that Norwegian aid could be suspended 
if Moi did not change his human rights record and his opinion regarding democracy (Waller, 1995: 118). In 
the wake of this statement a diplomatic incident caused Norway to end the aid-relationship with Kenya. 
Meanwhile, a number of public figures established the Foundation for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD). 
When a big demonstration of FORD in Nairobi in 1991 was brutally disrupted, donors realized they could no 
longer ignore the human rights violations by the Moi government (Waller, 1995: 118).!
! The above realization led to a meeting between donor countries, the WB, the IMF and Kenyan 
delegates at the Kenya Consultative Group meeting in november 1991. In this meeting various donors 
condemned the violations of human rights in Kenya (see point 26 in the report of proceedings), as well as the 
situation of authoritarian government and poor governance (World Bank, 1991: 6). The donors called for an 
increase in good governance and respect for human rights (see point 50) (World Bank, 1991: 11). In the 
concluding statements donors expressed their willingness to cut aid to Kenya (see point 49). They 
emphasized the need to discuss “the economic and social reforms required for continued external 
assistance” [emphasis added] and called for “another round of consultations in about six months to review 
progress in these areas, and as a basis for indications of further external assistance to Kenya” (World Bank, 
1991: 11-12). Thirteen state donors - complemented by the WB and the IMF - froze aid to Kenya.!
! In less than a week President Moi reacted to the withholding of aid by allowing multiparty elections 
(Perlez, 1991). In December 1992 these multiparty elections took place. This clearly marks a move towards 
democracy. The political conditions attached to the aid and the use of the negative linkage by donors seem 
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to have worked. However, it is important to examine the elections and their short- and long-term 
consequences in order to assess the effectiveness of the political conditionality in reaching its goals.!!
THE FIRST MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS: AN ASSESSMENT!
In december 1992 the first multiparty elections in Kenya took place. The elections were designed according 
to a First-Past-The-Post majority system (Ajulu, 1993: 99). Eight different parties participated to the elections 
which reflected a voter turnout of 69% (Ajulu, 1993: 99; Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1992). Despite being a 
milestone for democracy in Kenya, the elections were marked by a number of serious problems. First of all, 
the outcome of the elections was the reelection of the KANU and of President Moi. The KANU was rewarded 
100 of the 188 seats in parliament (Human Rights Watch, 1994b). The painful part of this reelection is that 
almost two thirds of the voting population voted for the opposition. Moi’s KANU was reelected with just 36% 
of the votes (Ajulu, 1993: 99). The resulted reelection has often been blamed to the combination of the 
electoral system and a divided opposition. The FORD (meanwhile evolved from movement to political party) 
was divided in two parties, FORD Asili and FORD Kenya. Together, these two FORDs received almost 50% 
of the votes (see table 1).!
! However, the outcome was not only 
to blame to a divided opposition. Moi’s 
KANU assured itself of the win before the 
elections took place in different ways. First 
of all, soon after the elections were 
announced the government passed a bill 
requiring the party winning the elections to 
win at least 25% of all votes in at least five 
different districts (Foeken and Dietz, 2000: 
129-130). As can be seen in Table 1, only 
Moi’s party was able to achieve this. 
Another example of a measure the 
government undertook in order to secure 
the KANU’s victory was the changing of 
number of constituencies and engaging in 
gerrymandering (Foeken and Dietz, 2000: 
131). In provinces where the opposition was 
favored , l ess cons t i tuenc ies were 
established. This way KANU was able to 
gain more seats with less voters. To win one 
seat, KANU needed on average 33.000 votes, in contrast to the 52.000 required per seat for the opposition 
(Foeken and Dietz, 2000: 132).!
! Besides these issues, the elections dealt with a number of illegal actions from the regime. Opposition 
candidates were abducted, voters were harassed and votes were bought (Foeken and Dietz, 2000: 133-135; 
Grosh and Orvis, 1996: 51). However, the biggest problem was the ethnic violence that arose in different 
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Table 1: Presidential Votes by Province
Kibaki!
D.P.
Matiba!
FORDA (A)
Moi!
KANU
Odinga!
FORD (K)
Others
Nairobi 69,715!
18%
165,553!
44%
62,410!
16%
75,888!
20%
-!
2%
Coast 32,201!
10%
33,399!
11%
188,296!
62%
42,796!
14%
-!
3%
N. Eastern 3,259!
5%
7,188!
11%
46,420!
72%
5,084!
8%
-!
4%
Eastern 392,481!
50%
79,436!
10%
290,372!
37%
13,673!
2%
-!
1%
Central 373,147!
35%
630,194!
60%
21,918!
2%
10,668!
1%
-!
2%
Rift Valley 98,302!
7%
214,727!
16%
961,488!
71%
75,465!
5%
-!
1%
Western 14,404!
2%
214,060!
38%
219,187!
39%
98,822!
17%
-!
4%
Nyanza 51,988!
6%
10,299!
1%
117,554!
15%
581,490!
75%
-!
3%
Total 1,035,507 1,354,856 1,927,640 903,886
Source: Ajulu, 1993: 9
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provinces in the wake of the announcement of the elections (Foeken and Dietz, 2000: 126; Grosh & Ovis, 
1996: 51; Ajulu, 1993: 100; Human Rights Watch, 1994b). This violence resulted in 1500 deaths and 300.000 
people left homeless (Brown, 2001: 727). A clash between various ethnic groups was President Moi’s main 
argument against democracy and it seemed that the KANU instigated this violence in order to make the 
forecast come true (Brown, 2001: 727).!
! Despite all the above problems, the elections also marked a number of positive developments. For 
the first time in years, opposition parties were allowed. Furthermore, political discussion was tolerated, which 
marks a gain in the human rights situation. However, the 1992 elections can not be marked as free and fair. 
The elections did not meet the standards of democracy, as confirmed by two international observer groups 
(Ajulu, 1993: 100). The governing party bought votes, intimidated opposition and even instigated large-scale 
ethnic violence. Moreover, it remained in charge and governed with the same authoritarian methods it did 
before (Grosh and Orvis, 1996: 53). If the goal of the political conditions donors attached to the aid was just 
to have multiparty elections, the political conditionality can be said to have worked. If, however, the goal was 
to spur a full democracy, it is clear that, in the short term, the donors and their conditions failed. It remains to 
see if the subsequent elections and period of time brought any change.!!
BEYOND THE FIRST ELECTIONS!
Soon after the elections, donors slowly resumed aid to Kenya, although providing a smaller volume than 
before and advocating an improvement of the human rights record (Brown, 2001: 732; Human Rights Watch, 
1994a: 30-31). In the period between the 1992 and the 1997 elections the political climate in Kenya did not 
change. The KANU regime continued to violate human rights, suppress the press and harass opposition 
members (Brown, 2001: 732). Moreover, the ethnic violence continued to rage on (Grosh and Orvis, 1996: 
51). A positive development was the enhanced possibility to discuss human rights and political change 
(Brown, 2001: 732). Unfortunately, this room for discussion did not lead to political change, which can be 
illustrated by the civil society supported National Convention Executive Council calling for political reforms 
without getting government response (Foeken and Dietz, 2000: 142). In the wake of this, a coalition of 
donors established the Donors Democracy Development Group in order to coordinate an election 
observation mission for the next elections.!
! The 1997 elections showed a somewhat mixed result for democracy in Kenya. Twenty-four parties 
participated to the elections, which marks a step forward. However, a divided opposition allowed President 
Moi to get reelected again (Foeken and Dietz, 2000: 141-142). The KANU, however, was rewarded just 107 
seats with the opposition filling the other 103 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1997). The elections were once 
again marked by a lack of level playing field. The KANU bought votes and intimidated press and opposition 
(Brown, 2001: 727). Ethnic violence reached a peak again, mostly victimizing opposition voters (Foeken and 
Dietz, 2000: 141). The final report of the DDDG seems to conclude that, again, elections were not fair 
(Foeken and Dietz, 2000: 147). Despite this conclusion, the US bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 
Labor concluded that “despite numerous logistical and other flaws, [the 1997 elections] generally reflected 
the will of the electorate” (US Department of State, 2000). This is a fairly positive assessment of the elections 
by a major donor and seems to reflect a positive conclusion on the elections from donor perspective.!!
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2002: A TURNING POINT?!
This US optimism seemed somewhat misplaced, as president Moi continued to rule in an authoritarian way. 
The political climate, however, changed during the period between the 1997 and 2002 elections. This was 
mainly due to the fact that president Moi was not eligible for a third term according to the Kenyan 
Constitution. Instead of focusing on changing the constitution Moi focused on appointing a succeeder to lead 
the KANU, which he found in Uhuru Kenyatta. Various party officials reacted by expressing their 
unhappiness with this decision and formed a faction within KANU, the Rainbow Alliance (Commonwealth 
Observer Group (COG), 2006: 5). Such a move of his own party members marks a crumbling of Moi’s power. 
Whereas the KANU dealt with further internal party unrest up to the elections, the opposition managed to 
unite in the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) (EUEOM, 2003: 9). This turned out to be a smart move as 
the NARC’s candidate Mwoi Kibaki won the elections with 62% of the votes (EUEOM, 2003: 9). These 
elections mark a turning point as not only the ethnic violence stopped, but an actual change of power 
occurred. Despite charges of bribery and control over the media by KANU, the overall assessment on the 
elections is very positive. Different observation missions concluded by stating that “it was the best General 
Election the country had ever had, and the most peaceful” (COG, 2006: 26) and even that “the 2002 
elections showed that Kenya has truly become a multiparty democracy” (EUEOM, 2003: 4). Freedom House 
furthermore promoted Kenya to the ‘Partly Free’ category (Freedom House, 2003).!
! However, shortly after the elections the optimism seemed to weaken. Before the elections a 
memorandum of understanding was signed by all parties running for elections, regarding the introduction of 
a prime minister and regarding some restrictions of the President’s power (EUEOM, 2008: 7). President 
Kibaki failed to honor these agreements and continued to rule with the centralized system he inherited from 
Moi. A (heavily flawed) proposition from Kibaki regarding these agreements sparked a splintering of NARC 
(EUEOM, 2008: 7). By the time new elections were approaching in 2007, the NARC as well as almost all 
other political parties had to cope with internal unrest. The elections were marked by bribes, use of 
government budget for personal campaigning and ballot box stuffing by Kibaki (EUEOM, 2008: 21-33). 
Kibaki was reelected with 46% of the votes. However, the biggest opposition party (the ODM) won most 
parliament seats. Moreover, the ODM’s presidential candidate Raila Odinga was rewarded 44% of the votes 
(EUEOM, 2008: 37). This tiny difference, in combination with the problems regarding fairness of the 
elections, led to questions both from political parties as from civil society. Election observer groups 
concluded their observation missions with the view that “the election process following the closing of the 
polls fell short of acceptable international standards” (COG, 2008: 28). Worst of all, in the wake of the 
outcome of the elections many incidents of renewed widespread ethnic violence were reported (Freedom 
House, 2011). All of this marks a sharp contrast with the step forward of the 2002 elections.!!
CURRENT SITUATION: DEMOCRACY IN KENYA?!
Before considering the current situation in Kenya, a positive development deserves mention. In 2010 a new 
Kenyan constitution was issued. The constitution can be considered a major achievement as it introduces 
and embeds human rights in the national legislation. Donor countries encouraged the constitution as it was 
assumed to contribute to the development of democracy (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2014: 
14-15). The constitution imposes both positive as negative obligations on the government. It includes 
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regulations regarding the rights of the Kenyan population, as well as regulations restricting the government’s 
power. Examples of such restrictions are Art. 75 on public servant conduct, Art. 80 on the expectations of 
leadership, Art. 131-132 on the functions of the president and Art. 160 on the independence of the judiciary 
(Constitution of Kenya, 2010). The constitution furthermore opened possibilities for further elaborations on 
regulation regarding human rights. When considering a list of bills and acts issued regarding human rights, it 
is notable that almost all national laws are issued after 2010 (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
(KNCHR), 2015: 102). Unfortunately, despite the extensive legislative framework to protect human rights, the 
KNCHR concludes that citizens have not been able to enjoy these rights (KNCHR, 2015: 90). The Universal 
Periodic Review on Kenya of the United Nations’ Human Rights Council seems to agree with this conclusion, 
considering the extensive list of recommendations (UN Human Rights Council, 2015: 13-28).!
! The current situation regarding democracy can be assessed by considering the most recent 
presidential elections in 2013. The 2010 Constitution stipulates rules regarding the elections (e.g. Art. 81), 
campaigning, party behavior etc. This new legal framework contributed to the fairness of the elections, for 
example by safeguarding freedom of speech in the media (EUEOM, 2013: 2). The elections resulted in the 
election of Uhuru Kenyatta. Shortcomings of the elections constituted a lack of transparency and major 
problems regarding the voter registration, even though the Constitution set out clear rules (EUEOM, 2013: 
13-14). Other shortcomings concern the eligibility of women, which remained low (as in previous elections) 
despite the introduced quota (EUEOM, 2013: 24), and the prevailing of nepotism in candidate nominations 
(Elections Observation Group (ELOG), 2013: 4-5). Despite candidates condemning any form of political 
violence, the elections were again marked by ethnic violence, however less widespread and intense than 
previous elections (EUEOM, 2013: 18-26; ELOG, 2013: 4). The final report of the ELOG - a coalition of 
Kenyan election observer groups - concludes that “it is clear that a number of issues still need to be 
addressed to ensure credible, peaceful, free and fair elections in the country” (ELOG, 2013: 6). !
! In conclusion, when considering both the respect for human rights (especially regarding civil and 
political rights) as the practice of elections, Kenya can not be considered a fully developed democracy. 
However, when considering the political history of Kenya it can be said that the country has made a leap 
forward towards democracy. When making the assessment on whether Kenya is a democracy, however, it is 
important to consider the view of the Kenyan population. In 2014, AFRObarometer found that just 12,5% of 
the Kenyan population perceived Kenya to be a full democracy (AFRObarometer, 2016). However, this 
needs to be complemented with the 61% of the Kenyan population who believes the country is a democracy, 
but with (major or minor) problems (AFRObarometer, 2016). Nevertheless, just 47% of the Kenyan 
population was satisfied with the way democracy works in Kenya (this includes the categories ‘fairly satisfied’ 
and ‘very satisfied’) (AFRObarometer, 2016). This suits the conclusion that democracy is not fully achieved.!!
CONCLUSION: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY IN KENYA!
The remaining question is whether the political conditionality donors applied in 1992 turned out to be 
effective. When considering the short term, there are two possible answers. The first answer is that it did not 
turn out to be effective. The elections issued by the Moi government were rigged, caused widespread 
political violence and did not result in a change in governing party or even result in the end of 
authoritarianism. This does not stroke with the donors’ demand for democracy. On the other hand, the 
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withholding of aid did cause Moi to allow multiparty elections. As multiparty elections is what the donors 
demanded, the political conditionality can be said to have worked. However, three other important factors 
were at play in Moi’s decision to give in to donor demands. First of all, Kenya was heavily dependent on the 
aid foreign donors were providing (Waller, 1995: 118). The government could not afford losing this support, or 
even losing a part of it. A second factor likely to have influenced Moi’s decision is the coordination of the 
donor action. Almost all major bilateral donors (plus the IMF and the WB) participated in the Consultative 
Group meeting in 1991 and were thus aligned in the withholding of aid. There was no option for Moi to call on 
other donors. A last and important factor was the internal call for democracy in Kenya. President Moi was not 
only pressured to allow a move towards democracy from outside the state, but from inside the state as well. 
Movements like FORD were strengthened by the donors’ decision to withhold aid in order to secure a move 
towards democracy (Waller, 1995: 119). Such a synthesis of internal and external pressure enhanced the 
effectiveness of the demands of both groups (Stokke, 1995: 50). The donors and the national movements 
complemented each other and made it harder for Moi to ignore the call for democracy. This seems to have 
been a decisive factor for the effectiveness of the conditionality.!
! When looking at the long-term consequences for democracy in Kenya, the effectiveness of political 
conditionality shows a mixed record. Since present Kenya can not be considered to be a full democracy, the 
donor conditions do not seem to have worked. However, the situation in Kenya regarding both democracy as 
human rights has made a leap forward compared to the situation in 1992. Political conditionality seems to 
have facilitated the steps towards this progress. Aid with a positive linkage is likely to have contributed to 
this, for example trough the UK educating citizens on elections on a large scale (DFID, 2013: 16) and the 
Kenyan government proposing a commission for election review trough its PRSP (Government of the 
Republic of Kenya, 2008: 127). This way conditionality with a positive linkage strengthened the effectiveness 
of political conditionality with a negative linkage. The 1992 elections can be considered to have been the first 
step in spurring a process of democracy-building. From that point of view donor conditionality was effective, 
although not immediately nor completely. The process of democracy-building in Kenya has a long way to go.!!
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EFFECTIVENESS OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY: UGANDA’S BAN ON HOMOSEXUALITY!
!
This chapter will examine the case of Uganda’s proposals on anti-homosexuality legislation in 2009 and 
2014. The effectiveness of political conditionality attached to aid to Uganda will be examined by assessing 
donor sanctions to Uganda, examining the anti-homosexuality legislation and by exploring the overall 
tolerance of homosexuality in Uganda. By studying these, the effectiveness of political conditionality will be 
assessed in terms of reaching its goal - ensuring respect for human rights, in particular regarding 
discrimination based on sexual orientation in Uganda.!!
BACKGROUND TO THE ANTI-HOMOSEXUALITY ACT!
Since its independence in 1962 Uganda received an increasing volume of development aid . Since 1986 3
President Museveni rules the country, stabilizing the economic development and political climate. This 
stability made Uganda a donor darling, a country Western donors gladly gave foreign aid to (Dicklith, Yost 
and Dougan, 2012: 455). However, the undemocratic regime in Uganda is marked by a number of problems 
of which one of the biggest is the high degree of corruption (Transparency International, 2016). The recent 
misuse of development funds cost Uganda its donor darling position (Transparency International, 2012). 
Furthermore, the regime is marked by a bad Human Rights record, especially regarding the rights of 
Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transgenders (LGBT) (Dicklith, Yost and Dougan, 2012: 455). Relevant for 
this case is Uganda’s Penal Code. From the first drafting in 1930 the Penal Code contains multiple 
provisions criminalizing homosexuality and penalizing ‘unnatural offenses' with imprisonment for seven years 
or even imprisonment for life (Johnson, 2014: 711-713).!
! In this legal context, in 2009 member of Parliament David Bahati introduced the Anti-Homosexuality 
Bill to the Ugandan parliament. The aim of the Bill was to further criminalize all aspects of homosexuality and 
to introduce harsher punishments (Johnson, 2014: 713-714). The ‘offense of homosexuality’ was to be 
penalized with the death penalty (Grossman, 2015: 337). The Bill was received with enthusiasm in 
parliament. However, after donors condemned the Bill, the discussion on the Bill was removed from 
Parliament’s agenda (Grossman, 2015: 337). President Museveni discarded the Bill as it had become ”a 
foreign policy issue” (BBC News, 13/01/2010).!!
THE 2014 ANTI-HOMOSEXUALITY ACT: GOVERNMENT VERSUS DONORS!
Despite the Anti-Homosexuality Bill being discarded, new proposals were prepared in order to reach the 
goals of the Bill. This led to the introduction of the Anti-Homosexuality Act to parliament in 2014. This time 
despite international condemnations the Act was passed through parliament and accepted as legislation 
(Rudman, 2015: 3). The Act resembles the Bill of 2009, but with a number of changes of which the major 
change is the crossing out of the death penalty. In accordance with the title of the Act, its aim is to prohibit 
homosexuality and to strengthen the provisions of the Penal Code regarding homosexuality. It does so in the 
second and third articles, which prohibit any act of homosexuality and penalize such acts with imprisonment 
for life (Anti-Homosexuality Act, 2014). Furthermore, the Act inter alia prohibits and penalizes same-sex 
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marriage (Art. 7), the promotion of homosexuality - which includes advocating against discrimination of 
homosexuals - (Art. 12), the aiding of homosexuals (Art. 13) and imposes the obligation to report 
homosexuals (Anti-Homosexuality Act, 2014).!
! In the wake of Parliaments’ decision to pass the Act, various donors reacted sharply by withholding 
or suspending development aid to Uganda. The Netherlands - the sixth biggest donor to Uganda in 2014 - 
suspended the part of its aid which was meant to strengthen the rule of law system, stating that the Act is 
unacceptable and that The Netherlands is not willing to contribute to a system that implements such laws 
(Government of the Netherlands, 2014; NPO, 24/02/2014). Norway - the seventh biggest donor to Uganda in 
2014 - diverted its aid to NGOs in Uganda, thereby bypassing the government (Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2014). Unfortunately, Uganda’s biggest aid donors - the USA and the UK - did not go as far 
as suspending aid. The USA expressed grave concern regarding the laws and disapproved them openly 
(Kerry, 2014).!
! Despite these donor statements and sanctions, the Ugandan government did not repeal nor change 
the Act. However, in August 2014 the Act was declared void by the Ugandan Constitutional Court. The Act 
was nullified as the Parliament voted on the adoption of the Act without having reached the required quorum 
(Oloka-Onyango & 9 Ors v. Attorney General, 2014). Because this is in conflict with both the Constitution as 
the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure, the Anti-Homosexuality Act was repealed (Oloka-Onyango & 9 Others 
v. Attorney General, 2014: 18). The nullifying of the Act does not seem to have to do with the donor sanctions 
as it regards a technicality, not the content of the Act. However, media suggest that the timing of the ruling 
was very convenient for president Museveni, thereby insinuating a role of the Ugandan government in the 
Court decision (BBC News, 2014). After the ruling most donors resumed their aid to Uganda.!!
CONCLUSION: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY IN UGANDA!
In order to assess the effectiveness of political conditionality in the case of Uganda, it is important to look 
beyond the repealing of the Anti-Homosexuality Act. It is important to examine the general opinion on and 
tolerance of homosexuality in Ugandan society. AFRObarometer shows that when posed the question 
whether homosexuality should continue to be illegal or homosexuals should be granted the same rights as 
all other Ugandan citizens, 91% of respondents agreed strongly with the first stance (AFRObarometer, 
2016). When considering that just 1,7% of respondents agreed with the same-rights-outlook, it seems clear 
that tolerance on homosexuality is very low in Ugandan society. This tolerance is lacking in the official 
spheres as well, considering that the recommendations the United Nations’ Human Rights Council’s 
Universal Periodic Review on Uganda made which did not enjoy the support of Uganda all concerned the 
anti-homosexuality legislation (UN Human Rights Council, 2011: 24-25). This prevailing intolerance in 
government and society leads to violence against homosexuals (Freedom House, 2015). Furthermore, 
shortly after the ruling of the Constitutional Court the drafting of a new Sexual Practice Bill was started 
(Rudman, 2015: 4).!
! It is possible that the donor sanctions have inspired the court in its repealing of the Act. This seems 
especially likely if the government did indeed have a role in the decision. However, both the political climate 
as the culture in society have clearly not changed. On the short term political conditionality seems not to 
have been effective. Unfortunately, as of 2016 it is not possible to assess longer term effects. 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IN CONCLUSION: KEY FINDINGS!
!
The two cases offer some insights and conclusions on the effectiveness of political conditionality. This final 
chapter will offer an overview of these insight and conclusions and will answer the main research question in 
order to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of political conditionality. It should be noted that due to 
the Ugandan case being so recent, conclusions regarding the case are somewhat limited. Academic sources 
are few. Moreover, it is not possible to assess the long-term effectiveness of political conditionality in the 
Ugandan case.!!
A MIXED RECORD OF EFFECTIVENESS!
In answer to the research question “what have been the effects of political conditionality in development aid 
to Kenya and Uganda?” the effects and outcome of these effects can be said to show a mixed record. In 
Kenya, the donor conditions - multiparty elections - were implemented quickly after donors suspended aid to 
Kenya. However, the elections and the outcome of the elections were not what donors aimed for. In Uganda, 
the government did not even consider implementing the donor conditions. The overall assessment on the 
effectiveness of political conditionality in these two cases is that political conditionality is not effective in order 
to reach its objectives. However, the case of Kenya offers some optimism regarding the long term 
effectiveness of political conditionality. From this case it seems that political conditions set by donors can 
trigger the first step towards its objectives - in this case the first step towards democracy.!!
INFLUENCES ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY!
The cases of Kenya and Uganda show two factors which influence the effectiveness of political conditionality. 
The first factor comprises the interaction between external pressure (from donors) and internal pressure 
(from society) to the aid-receiving government to comply to the conditions. The interaction between these 
two influences the effectiveness of political conditionality. Kenya offers an example, as it seems unlikely that 
President Moi would have given in to the donor conditions without the internal unrest and call for democracy. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that donors would have withheld aid and would have required multiparty elections if it 
wasn’t for the Kenyan population’s call for democracy. The failure of political conditionality in Uganda is 
another example of this factor at play. The Ugandan government is supported by Ugandan society in its 
stance on homosexuality. It is likely that the Ugandan population saw the donors’ sanctions as a interference 
in Uganda’s sovereignty, instead of considering it a help. The absence of internal pressure thus seems to 
decrease the effectiveness of political conditionality, whereas a strong internal pressure advocating the same 
objective as the donors’ conditions seems to enhance the effectiveness of political conditionality .!4
! The second factor concerns the inconsistency of donor behavior and double standards of donors. 
Consider Kenya, where donors resumed providing aid to the government even though the elections were 
rigged and despite the Kenyan government continuing to rule in an authoritarian way. Such double standards 
are employed in Uganda as well. Aid was withheld when the Anti-Homosexuality Act was signed, instead of 
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being withheld before, when homosexuality was criminalized as well. Such inconsistencies in donor behavior 
can influence the credibility of donor sanctions and conditions, making it easier to discard the conditions.!!
CONCLUSION: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATE!
The findings from the two cases contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of political conditionality. The 
cases offer insight in the broader effectiveness of political conditionality, especially in the lack of 
effectiveness of political conditionality. However, the examined cases are only two cases where political 
conditionality in development aid was applied. As applying political conditionality to development aid occurs 
more often it is important for further research to examine other cases as well. This can offer new insights 
regarding the effectiveness of political conditionality, the factors influencing this (lack of) effectiveness and 
how to enhance its effectiveness. There remains a lot to learn for all actors in the field of development and 
development aid.!!
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ANNEX!
!
FIGURE 1: ODA TO KENYA!
Source: World Bank (2016), Africa Development Indicators. World DataBank, accessible on http://!
! databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx, accessed on 30/05/2016!!
Description indicators (from World Bank, World DataBank 2016):!
- Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$): Net official development 
assistance is disbursement flows (net of repayment of principal) that meet the DAC definition of ODA and 
are made to countries and territories on the DAC list of aid recipients. Net official aid refers to aid flows 
(net of repayments) from official donors to countries and territories in part II of the DAC list of recipients: 
more advanced countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the countries of the former Soviet Union, and 
certain advanced developing countries and territories. Official aid is provided under terms and conditions 
similar to those for ODA. Part II of the DAC List was abolished in 2005. The collection of data on official aid 
and other resource flows to Part II countries ended with 2004 data. Data are in current U.S. dollars.!
- Net bilateral aid flows from DAC donors, Total (current US$): Net bilateral aid flows from DAC donors are 
the net disbursements of official development assistance (ODA) or official aid from the members of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Net disbursements are gross disbursements of grants and 
loans minus repayments of principal on earlier loans. ODA consists of loans made on concessional terms 
(with a grant element of at least 25 percent, calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent) and grants 
made to promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA 
recipients. Official aid refers to aid flows from official donors to countries and territories in part II of the 
DAC list of recipients: more advanced countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the countries of the former 
Soviet Union, and certain advanced developing countries and territories. Official aid is provided under 
terms and conditions similar to those for ODA. Part II of the DAC List was abolished in 2005. The 
collection of data on official aid and other resource flows to Part II countries ended with 2004 data. DAC 
members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
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Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and Commission of the European Communities. 
Regional aggregates include data for economies not specified elsewhere. World and income group totals 
include aid not allocated by country or region. Data are in current U.S. dollars.!!!
FIGURE 2: ODA TO UGANDA!
Source: World Bank (2016), Africa Development Indicators. World DataBank, accessible on http://!
! databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx, accessed on 30/05/2016!!
Description indicators (from World Bank, World DataBank 2016):!
- Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$): Net official development 
assistance (ODA) consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of 
principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and 
welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients. It includes loans with a grant element 
of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent). Net official aid refers to aid flows (net 
of repayments) from official donors to countries and territories in part II of the DAC list of recipients: more 
advanced countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the countries of the former Soviet Union, and certain 
advanced developing countries and territories. Official aid is provided under terms and conditions similar to 
those for ODA. Part II of the DAC List was abolished in 2005. The collection of data on official aid and 
other resource flows to Part II countries ended with 2004 data. Data are in current U.S. dollars.!
- Net bilateral aid flows from DAC donors, Total (current US$): Net bilateral aid flows from DAC donors are 
the net disbursements of official development assistance (ODA) or official aid from the members of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Net disbursements are gross disbursements of grants and 
loans minus repayments of principal on earlier loans. ODA consists of loans made on concessional terms 
(with a grant element of at least 25 percent, calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent) and grants 
made to promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA 
recipients. Official aid refers to aid flows from official donors to countries and territories in part II of the 
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DAC list of recipients: more advanced countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the countries of the former 
Soviet Union, and certain advanced developing countries and territories. Official aid is provided under 
terms and conditions similar to those for ODA. Part II of the DAC List was abolished in 2005. The 
collection of data on official aid and other resource flows to Part II countries ended with 2004 data. DAC 
members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and Commission of the European Communities. 
Regional aggregates include data for economies not specified elsewhere. World and income group totals 
include aid not allocated by country or region. Data are in current U.S. dollars.
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